High Court Test 1
10 min40 WPM required615 words
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This Court, having carefully considered the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the counter affidavit submitted on behalf of the respondents, the rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner, and the oral arguments advanced at considerable length by learned counsel appearing for both parties, is of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate dated the fifteenth of March of the current year is not sustainable in law, suffers from a violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice, and therefore deserves to be quashed and set aside with all consequential reliefs flowing therefrom. The petitioner, who is a permanent resident of this district and has been engaged in the business of retail sale of general merchandise for the past seventeen years, had applied for the renewal of his trade licence under the relevant provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act along with all requisite documents including the previous licence, proof of payment of municipal taxes, a no-objection certificate from the fire department, and the prescribed renewal fee amounting to three thousand five hundred rupees. The licensing authority, without assigning any reasons whatsoever for its decision and without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner who had submitted a complete and properly documented application, rejected the application through a single-line endorsement noting that the application was rejected and directing the petitioner to appear before the office for clarification, an endorsement that was communicated to the petitioner after a delay of nearly five months, during which period the petitioner was unable to carry on his business lawfully, causing him significant commercial loss, damage to his business relationships, and considerable personal distress. The principle of natural justice, which encompasses the twin requirements of notice and a fair hearing, known by the Latin maxims audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua, is so deeply and irreversibly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence that any decision adversely affecting a person's legal rights, legitimate interests, or means of livelihood must be made only after affording that person a reasonable, effective, and genuine opportunity to present their case, respond to any adverse material, and demonstrate why the adverse decision should not be made. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly affirmed this principle in a long and unbroken line of authoritative decisions beginning with the foundational case of Maneka Gandhi versus Union of India and including numerous subsequent judgments of constitutional and regular benches, holding consistently and unanimously that the duty to act fairly is an implied and non-derogable requirement in the exercise of every statutory or administrative power that may result in prejudice to any person. The respondents have placed before this Court no material whatsoever to establish any compelling circumstance, public interest necessity, or statutory exception that would justify dispensing with the procedural safeguard of prior hearing in the present case, and their only plea has been that the petitioner could have made a representation after receiving the rejection order, which is no answer to the constitutional infirmity in the decision-making process. The impugned order is accordingly quashed and set aside. The licensing authority is directed to reconsider the application of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law after providing him a personal hearing at a date to be communicated to him with reasonable advance notice of not less than two weeks, and to pass a reasoned order disposed of within sixty days from the date of the hearing, with reasons for any decision adverse to the petitioner communicated in writing within the same period. The petitioner shall cooperate with the hearing and furnish any additional documents that the licensing authority may reasonably require within fifteen days of any such request.